Explained: How to Read the US Military Mind Through the NDAA

New Delhi (ABC Live): The United States has enacted a National Defense Authorization Act, commonly known as the NDAA, for every fiscal year for more than six decades. Through this annual law, Congress authorises defence programmes, regulates the armed forces and supervises the Department of Defense.

Initially, the NDAA mainly addressed military personnel, weapons and operations. However, its scope expanded as American security priorities changed. Consequently, the Act now affects technology, industry, foreign investment, alliances and military justice.

This analysis examines the 20 NDAAs enacted from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2026. At first, Congress focused mainly on Iraq, Afghanistan, counterterrorism and wartime readiness. Thereafter, budget limits, military misconduct and procurement failures pushed lawmakers towards institutional reform.

Meanwhile, strategic competition with China and Russia became more important. As a result, recent NDAAs have addressed Taiwan, Ukraine, AUKUS, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, military space and defence supply chains.

Moreover, Congress now treats personnel welfare and production capacity as parts of military readiness. Therefore, the NDAA no longer operates merely as an annual Pentagon policy bill.

In addition, this report presents a US military mind map. In particular, the framework shows how Congress connects political authority, armed services, combatant commands, advanced technology, military personnel, alliances and defence manufacturing.

Key Findings

First, the 20-year record shows a clear shift from counterterrorism towards competition with China and Russia.

Second, nominal authorisations increased from about $680.2 billion in FY2010 to $890.6 billion in FY2026.

Moreover, the FY2019 Act connected defence policy with foreign-investment screening and export controls.

Meanwhile, the FY2020 Act created the United States Space Force.

Subsequently, the FY2021 Act strengthened Indo-Pacific deterrence and artificial-intelligence policy.

In addition, the FY2022 Act reduced commanders’ control over prosecutions for several serious military offences.

Thereafter, the FY2023 and later Acts focused strongly on Ukraine, Taiwan, ammunition and industrial capacity.

Similarly, the FY2024 Act advanced AUKUS cooperation and defence supply-chain security.

Finally, the FY2025 and FY2026 Acts placed greater emphasis on personnel welfare, procurement, research and production.

What Is the National Defense Authorization Act?

The NDAA is the principal annual policy law governing the United States military. In practice, it authorises programmes and establishes rules for the Department of Defense and several related national-security bodies.

Through the Act, Congress can influence troop strength, military salaries, weapons purchases, shipbuilding and research. Moreover, it can regulate cybersecurity, nuclear policy, military justice and security assistance to foreign countries.

In addition, Congress can require reports, impose deadlines and restrict executive action. Therefore, the NDAA serves both as a policy law and as an oversight mechanism.

However, the NDAA does not normally provide the final authority to spend money from the US Treasury. Instead, separate appropriations legislation usually provides that authority.

Consequently, an authorised amount does not always become final expenditure. For example, appropriators may provide less money, more money or emergency funding through another law.

The Congressional Research Service guide to the NDAA process explains this distinction. Similarly, the Government Accountability Office’s appropriations-law resources explain the wider federal spending framework.

Why Does Congress Pass the NDAA Every Year?

Security threats continue to change

Military threats do not remain fixed. For example, one year may bring a terrorist attack, while another may produce a regional war, missile crisis or major cyber incident.

Therefore, Congress reviews defence policy every year. As a result, lawmakers can redirect programmes before outdated assumptions become permanent.

Moreover, the annual cycle allows Congress to respond to unexpected events. Consequently, Ukraine, Taiwan, cyberattacks and new missile threats can enter defence policy quickly.

Military technology develops rapidly

Military technology also changes quickly. In particular, artificial intelligence, drones, satellites, hypersonic missiles and cyber systems can alter warfare within a short period.

Therefore, a law written several years earlier may not address current risks. Thus, the annual NDAA allows Congress to update legal authority and funding priorities.

Moreover, technology often develops in private companies and civilian laboratories. Consequently, the NDAA increasingly affects universities, software firms, chipmakers and commercial space companies.

Congress maintains control over the military

The US Constitution gives Congress authority to raise and support armies, maintain a navy and regulate the armed forces.

Accordingly, the NDAA prevents military policy from becoming the exclusive domain of the President or the Pentagon. Through the Act, Congress can demand information, limit programmes and create new institutions.

Moreover, annual review strengthens civilian oversight. Therefore, defence officials must regularly explain costs, delays and strategic assumptions to elected lawmakers.

The constitutional background appears in the US Constitution Annotated discussion of Congress’s power to support armies.

Personnel policies need regular revision

Congress must also review military pay, recruitment, housing, health care and retirement.

Moreover, personnel requirements can change after a war, economic shock or recruitment crisis. Therefore, the annual NDAA affects both military strategy and the daily lives of service personnel.

For example, Congress may increase junior-enlisted pay or improve family housing. Consequently, personnel provisions can directly influence recruitment and retention.

The NDAA has become a must-pass law

Congress has enacted the NDAA annually for decades. Therefore, lawmakers generally expect the measure to become law.

As a result, members often place wider national-security provisions inside it. However, this practice also makes the legislation longer and more difficult to examine.

Moreover, late negotiations can limit the time available for scrutiny. Consequently, lawmakers may vote on hundreds of provisions as part of one large package.

The CRS guide to navigating the NDAA reported that the enrolled FY2025 Act contained 794 pages of policy provisions.

US Military Mind Map: How the NDAA Connects American Power

The US military mind map places the annual NDAA at the centre of the wider defence system. From there, it connects political authority, armed services, regional commands, technology, personnel and industry.

Political and civilian control

The first branch includes Congress, the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

First, Congress passes the NDAA. The President then signs or vetoes it. Thereafter, the Department of Defense implements its provisions.

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs provide professional military advice. Nevertheless, elected leaders and civilian officials retain legal control over defence policy.

Therefore, the NDAA represents more than military planning. It also represents the constitutional relationship between civilian authority and armed power.

Six armed services

The second branch contains the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Space Force and Coast Guard.

Congress authorises personnel and programmes for these services. Moreover, it can alter their structure, missions and procurement priorities.

For example, the FY2020 NDAA established the Space Force as the sixth armed service. Consequently, military space received a separate institutional identity.

The CRS Defense Primer on the US Space Force explains its position under the Department of the Air Force.

Geographic combatant commands

The third branch connects the Pentagon with the Indo-Pacific, European, Central, Africa, Southern and Northern Commands.

Through the NDAA, Congress can require posture reviews, infrastructure plans and regional capability assessments. Therefore, the Act influences how US military power operates across different theatres.

For example, Congress can direct additional attention towards Indo-Pacific bases or European deterrence. Consequently, regional policy can change even without creating a new military service.

Moreover, the combatant commands turn national policy into operational planning. Thus, they connect Washington’s strategic decisions with military activity abroad.

Functional combatant commands

The mind map should also include Strategic Command, Cyber Command, Special Operations Command, Transportation Command and Space Command.

Unlike geographic commands, these bodies provide capabilities across several regions. Therefore, they connect nuclear deterrence, cyber operations, logistics and space systems with global military planning.

Moreover, their importance has grown as warfare has become more interconnected. For instance, a regional conflict may depend on satellite communications, cyber protection and global transport at the same time.

Consequently, modern defence policy cannot separate regional operations from functional capabilities.

Strategic regions and adversaries

Another branch should show Iraq, Afghanistan, China, Russia, Taiwan, Ukraine, Iran and North Korea.

Initially, Iraq and Afghanistan dominated American defence planning. However, China gradually became the principal long-term military challenge.

Meanwhile, Russia returned as a major concern because of the Ukraine war. Therefore, current planning increasingly assumes competition across Europe, the Indo-Pacific, space and cyberspace.

Moreover, Iran and North Korea remain important because of missiles and nuclear risks. Consequently, the United States must prepare for several threats at the same time.

Technology and future warfare

The technology branch should include artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons, drones, cyber operations, satellites, quantum technology and hypersonic missiles.

Modern military power increasingly depends on civilian research and digital infrastructure. Consequently, the NDAA now affects universities, technology companies and commercial space businesses.

Moreover, access to semiconductors, software and secure communications can determine battlefield performance. Therefore, technology policy has become part of defence policy.

At the same time, dependence on foreign suppliers creates new risks. As a result, Congress increasingly examines where critical components are designed and manufactured.

Defence-industrial capacity

The industrial branch should include weapons companies, ammunition plants, shipyards, aircraft factories, missile production and critical-mineral suppliers.

Recent wars have shown that advanced weapons alone cannot sustain a prolonged conflict. Instead, a country must produce missiles, shells and replacement parts at sufficient speed.

Therefore, recent NDAAs increasingly resemble industrial-mobilisation laws. Moreover, Congress now treats factories, skilled workers and supply chains as elements of national power.

For example, the Ukraine war exposed limits in ammunition production. Consequently, Congress supported multiyear procurement and expansion of production capacity.

Personnel and military justice

The personnel branch should cover pay, recruitment, housing, medical care, child care, retirement and military courts.

Congress increasingly views personnel welfare as an operational requirement. For example, poor housing or weak family support can harm recruitment and retention.

Similarly, a military justice system that lacks trust can weaken morale. Consequently, personnel rights and military readiness now form part of the same policy debate.

Moreover, the creation of special trial counsel reduced commanders’ control over several serious prosecutions. Therefore, the NDAA also became a vehicle for legal accountability.

Alliances and security partnerships

The alliance branch should include NATO, Japan, South Korea, Australia, the United Kingdom, Taiwan and Ukraine.

Through the NDAA, Congress can authorise training, military assistance and joint programmes. Moreover, it can set conditions for sharing technology and weapons.

Therefore, the Act helps convert political alliances into operational capability. In addition, it can strengthen the defence industries of allied countries.

AUKUS provides an important example. Because the partnership involves submarines and advanced technology, Congress had to adjust legal and export-control arrangements.

Oversight and funding

The final branch should include programme authorisation, appropriations, audits, reports and procurement controls.

The Pentagon proposes and manages programmes. However, Congress can modify, delay or stop them.

Therefore, the mind map demonstrates the NDAA’s central role. It links strategy, institutions, people, technology and money within one annual framework.

What the Funding Data Shows

Wartime spending remained high

The FY2010 and FY2011 totals exceeded $680 billion and $720 billion respectively. At that stage, the United States still supported large operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Therefore, substantial resources went towards deployments, transport, intelligence and equipment replacement. Moreover, contractor support and medical requirements added to the cost.

Meanwhile, the military had to replace equipment damaged or consumed during operations. Consequently, wartime funding remained high even as political support for the wars weakened.

Budget pressure produced a decline

By FY2015, the authorised total had fallen to about $577.1 billion. This figure stood roughly 20% below the FY2011 level.

The decline reflected the Iraq withdrawal, the Afghanistan drawdown and statutory budget limits. However, American military commitments did not disappear.

Instead, Congress had to balance overseas operations against tighter spending controls. Consequently, several programmes faced delay, reduction or restructuring.

Moreover, the lower nominal total did not necessarily mean a smaller global role. Rather, it reflected a difficult transition between wartime requirements and budget restraint.

Great-power competition reversed the decline

From FY2017 onwards, authorisations began rising again. By FY2021, the total had reached about $731.6 billion.

This increase reflected a wider strategic shift. In particular, Congress funded naval power, long-range weapons, missile defence, cyber operations and space systems.

Moreover, Indo-Pacific infrastructure received greater attention. Therefore, the budget increasingly supported preparation for conflict with a major state.

At the same time, nuclear modernisation continued. Consequently, the spending increase covered both conventional and strategic forces.

Ukraine produced another sharp increase

The authorised amount rose from $768.2 billion in FY2022 to $847.3 billion in FY2023. Thus, the increase reached approximately $79.1 billion in one year.

The Ukraine war exposed shortages in ammunition, missiles and air-defence interceptors. Consequently, Congress increased support for stock replenishment and factory capacity.

Moreover, lawmakers worried about maintaining sufficient weapons for a possible Indo-Pacific crisis. Therefore, Taiwan and Ukraine became connected through the same industrial debate.

Thereafter, the authorised amount reached $890.6 billion in FY2026. As a result, the total grew by about 15.9% between FY2022 and FY2026.

Phase One: FY2007–FY2011

Iraq and Afghanistan dominated policy

The first five Acts focused heavily on Iraq, Afghanistan and counterterrorism. Congress authorised personnel, armoured vehicles, aircraft, intelligence systems and military medical services.

Meanwhile, lawmakers examined the management of overseas operations. Therefore, contractor oversight and equipment shortages became recurring subjects.

Moreover, Congress had to address the human cost of war. Consequently, medical care and disability processing received greater attention.

Wounded Warrior reforms changed personnel policy

Operational failures forced Congress to look inward. In particular, poor conditions and delays in disability assessments produced major reforms in the FY2008 Act.

Consequently, Congress addressed medical treatment, case management and support for injured personnel. Thus, the NDAA became a tool for correcting administrative failures.

Moreover, these reforms showed that readiness involved more than battlefield equipment. Therefore, care for injured personnel became part of defence accountability.

Detention entered the annual law

The Acts also included provisions concerning Guantanamo Bay and terrorism suspects.

As a result, the NDAA moved into constitutional and civil-liberties debates. It was no longer limited to weapons, personnel and military administration.

Moreover, detention policy raised questions about executive power. Consequently, the annual defence law became a vehicle for resolving wider legal disputes.

Phase Two: FY2012–FY2016

Detention authority caused controversy

The FY2012 NDAA addressed military detention authority linked to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force.

Supporters argued that the provision clarified existing authority. However, critics feared that broad wording could support indefinite detention.

Congress stated that the law did not alter existing rules concerning US citizens and lawful residents. Nevertheless, the dispute showed how the NDAA had become a vehicle for defining executive power.

Moreover, the controversy extended beyond traditional military policy. Therefore, the NDAA entered debates about constitutional rights and due process.

Budget limits shaped planning

During this period, Congress faced continuing military demands and statutory spending controls.

Therefore, the Pentagon delayed or reduced some programmes while protecting high-priority capabilities. Meanwhile, war-related funding remained partly separated from the base budget.

However, repeated short-term adjustments created uncertainty. Consequently, military planners found it harder to maintain stable procurement schedules.

Sexual assault drove justice reform

The FY2014 Act introduced important provisions on sexual assault, victim protection and evidence.

Congress had lost confidence in the traditional command structure’s handling of serious complaints. Consequently, military justice became a central NDAA subject.

Moreover, lawmakers increased protections for victims and reviewed commanders’ authority. Therefore, the reform process gradually changed the balance between command control and legal independence.

Retirement reform changed personnel policy

The FY2016 Act established the blended military retirement system.

Under the new model, eligible personnel could receive government contributions to the Thrift Savings Plan. At the same time, qualifying personnel retained access to a modified pension.

Therefore, the reform extended retirement benefits to more people who left before completing a full military career. Moreover, it attempted to control long-term personnel costs.

Phase Three: FY2017–FY2021

Congress modernised military justice

The FY2017 Act enacted the Military Justice Act of 2016. It reorganised offences, procedures and sentencing.

At the same time, Congress promoted rapid prototyping and rapid fielding. Lawmakers believed that the normal acquisition system moved too slowly.

Therefore, this phase combined institutional reform with faster technology adoption. Moreover, Congress increasingly connected legal efficiency with operational readiness.

Economic security entered the NDAA

The FY2019 Act included the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act and the Export Control Reform Act.

These laws strengthened scrutiny of foreign investment and technology transfer. Consequently, company ownership, data access and semiconductor control became defence concerns.

Moreover, Congress increasingly viewed economic dependence as a security risk. Therefore, the NDAA expanded beyond traditional Pentagon administration.

The CRS report on the FY2019 NDAA explains the wider provisions. In addition, the CRS report on the Export Control Reform Act provides legal background.

Congress created the Space Force

The FY2020 NDAA created the United States Space Force.

This decision recognised that satellites, navigation, missile warning and communications had become essential to warfare. Moreover, it gave military space an independent institutional identity.

Consequently, space policy moved from a supporting role towards the centre of military planning. Therefore, future NDAAs began treating orbital security as a core defence concern.

The Indo-Pacific became central

The FY2021 Act established the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and strengthened congressional attention to China.

It also addressed artificial intelligence and military-base naming. President Donald Trump vetoed the Act; however, Congress overrode the veto.

Therefore, the episode demonstrated the NDAA’s unusual bipartisan strength. Moreover, it showed that congressional defence priorities could prevail over presidential objections.

Phase Four: FY2022–FY2026

Military prosecutions became more independent

The FY2022 Act created special trial counsel for specified serious offences.

Previously, commanders exercised substantial influence over prosecution decisions. However, the reform shifted important decisions outside the normal chain of command.

Therefore, military justice moved closer to an independent prosecutorial model. Moreover, Congress responded to years of criticism about command influence.

Ukraine exposed production weaknesses

The Ukraine war showed that modern conflict consumes ammunition and missiles rapidly.

Consequently, Congress supported multiyear procurement, stock replenishment and higher production rates. Moreover, the debate shifted from weapon quality to manufacturing capacity.

At the same time, the United States had to preserve stocks for other emergencies. Therefore, industrial capacity became a central strategic concern.

Taiwan became an operational issue

The FY2023 Act also strengthened attention to Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific.

A Taiwan conflict could create enormous demand for ships, missiles and secure communications. Therefore, Congress examined regional posture, security assistance and supply resilience.

Moreover, Taiwan planning increased concern about naval production. Consequently, shipyards and missile factories gained greater political importance.

AUKUS required legal changes

The FY2024 Act advanced cooperation under AUKUS.

The partnership covers nuclear-powered submarines and advanced technologies. Consequently, Congress had to address technology transfer, export controls and industrial cooperation.

Moreover, AUKUS showed that alliances increasingly depend on shared production. Therefore, legal restrictions had to be balanced against security cooperation.

The CRS report on AUKUS advanced capabilities explains several related issues.

Supply-chain security became central

The FY2024 Act also strengthened defence-industrial policy.

For example, it addressed dependence on potential adversaries, logistics software and long-lead munitions. Moreover, it increased attention to domestic purchasing and secure suppliers.

Consequently, supply-chain policy became part of military planning. The CRS analysis of FY2024 defence-industrial provisions provides additional detail.

Personnel welfare became a readiness issue

The FY2025 Act focused strongly on enlisted pay, housing and child care.

Congress recognised that advanced weapons cannot compensate for weak recruitment. Therefore, personnel conditions became part of strategic readiness.

Moreover, military families influence whether experienced personnel remain in service. Consequently, quality-of-life provisions gained greater importance.

FY2026 continued procurement reform

The FY2026 Act authorised $890.6 billion within its stated scope.

Moreover, Congress increased several procurement and research authorisations. At the same time, it adjusted personnel and operations accounts.

Thus, the Act continued the shift towards technology, production and faster acquisition. Nevertheless, long-term industrial weaknesses remained difficult to solve through legislation alone.

Five Major Changes Across 20 Years

The main strategic threat changed

In 2007, US defence policy centred on Iraq, Afghanistan and terrorism.

By 2026, however, China had become the principal long-term planning challenge. Meanwhile, Russia, Iran, North Korea and terrorism remained important.

Therefore, naval power, space systems, cyber capability and Indo-Pacific logistics received greater attention.

Technology policy became defence policy

Earlier Acts treated technology mainly as part of weapons procurement.

Recent Acts, by contrast, treat semiconductors, software, artificial intelligence and communications as strategic assets. Consequently, Congress now regulates civilian investment and research partnerships through national-security law.

Moreover, technology restrictions can affect global business. Therefore, NDAA provisions now influence companies far beyond the traditional defence sector.

Military welfare became operational policy

Medical care, retirement, housing and military justice all affect readiness.

Therefore, personnel welfare has moved towards the centre of defence policy. Moreover, Congress increasingly treats institutional trust as a military capability.

Consequently, quality-of-life provisions are no longer viewed as separate from strategy.

Industrial capacity returned as a measure of power

For many years, American planning focused strongly on technological superiority.

However, the Ukraine war showed that production volume also matters. Thus, factories, shipyards, workers and component supplies now receive greater attention.

Moreover, a prolonged war requires continuous replacement of weapons. Therefore, industrial capacity has returned as a central measure of military strength.

Congress expanded its national-security role

The annual Act allows Congress to require reports, limit executive action and condition foreign assistance.

Nevertheless, this power also creates a risk. Because the NDAA is considered essential, lawmakers may add provisions that deserve separate debate.

Consequently, the Act provides strong oversight but also encourages legislative overload.

Critical Assessment

Why the annual system works

First, annual passage forces the Pentagon to return to Congress regularly. Therefore, programmes cannot continue indefinitely without legislative review.

Second, Congress can respond to new technology and crises. For example, the Space Force and Ukraine-related production measures emerged through the annual process.

Third, the Act gives lawmakers access to reports and certifications. As a result, Congress can obtain information that might otherwise remain inside the executive branch.

Moreover, annual legislation can correct administrative failures. Consequently, military policy remains open to repeated democratic review.

Why the system has become difficult

However, the law has grown dramatically in size and scope.

Because negotiations often continue until late in the year, lawmakers may have limited time to examine the final text. Moreover, the must-pass character of the NDAA creates pressure to accept disputed provisions.

Annual instructions also cannot solve every structural problem. For example, Congress can demand faster shipbuilding, but legislation cannot instantly produce skilled workers or new shipyards.

Finally, higher authorisations do not guarantee better results. Cost overruns, failed tests and delayed programmes can reduce the value of additional spending.

Therefore, Congress must examine outcomes rather than relying only on annual funding totals.

What the Record Means for India

India should monitor the NDAA early

India should follow House and Senate drafts rather than waiting for the final law.

Provisions on China, sanctions, technology transfer or the Indo-Pacific may affect Indian interests. Therefore, Indian ministries and defence companies need an annual monitoring process.

Moreover, committee reports often reveal congressional priorities before enactment. Consequently, early analysis can help India prepare for policy changes.

Defence cooperation can change through legislation

The NDAA can influence joint exercises, intelligence cooperation and technology partnerships.

Consequently, it may shape India–US defence relations even when India is not directly named in headline provisions.

Moreover, export-control changes can affect Indian companies and research bodies. Therefore, legal monitoring should accompany diplomatic engagement.

Industrial depth matters

The American experience shows that purchasing advanced platforms is not enough.

India also needs ammunition reserves, repair capacity and secure supply chains. Therefore, procurement policy must support long-term production rather than one-time purchases.

Moreover, domestic manufacturers need predictable orders. ABC Live examined related issues in its report on the Draft Defence Acquisition Procedure-2026.

Technology ownership remains essential

Artificial intelligence, quantum technology and electronic warfare increasingly determine military advantage.

Therefore, India needs control over critical code, components and intellectual property. Moreover, dependence on imported systems can create operational risks during a crisis.

ABC Live examined this concern in India’s Military Quantum Mission Policy Framework.

Personnel welfare affects readiness

Finally, India should note the growing American emphasis on housing, health care and military justice.

These issues are not separate from operational power. Instead, they directly affect recruitment, retention and institutional trust.

Therefore, personnel policy should remain part of wider defence reform.

ABC Live Overall Assessment

The 20-year NDAA record shows how the United States uses annual legislation to adapt military power.

Initially, Congress managed the costs and consequences of Iraq and Afghanistan. Thereafter, it addressed detention, sexual assault, retirement and procurement failures.

Subsequently, the NDAA shifted towards China, Russia, space, cyber operations and economic security. More recently, Ukraine and Taiwan pushed industrial capacity to the centre of defence policy.

Moreover, the US military mind map explains the law’s wider reach. The NDAA connects Congress and the President with the Pentagon, armed services, global commands, personnel, technology companies and weapons manufacturers.

However, the Act’s success has also created its main weakness. Because lawmakers expect it to pass, they increasingly place wider policy measures inside it.

Therefore, the NDAA provides strong democratic oversight, but it also concentrates too much national-security legislation in one annual package.

Conclusion

The last 20 National Defense Authorization Acts document a major change in American defence policy.

Initially, the United States focused on long counterinsurgency campaigns. However, it later shifted towards high-technology competition with powerful states.

Accordingly, Congress gave greater attention to China, Russia, space, cyber operations, missiles, artificial intelligence and industrial production.

Moreover, the annual Act now shapes much more than Pentagon administration. It connects political authority with the armed services, global commands, military personnel, technology companies and weapons factories.

Therefore, the NDAA should be understood as the legislative operating system of American military power. Its annual passage allows Congress to review and redesign that system.

Nevertheless, its expanding size creates a serious challenge. Congress must retain strong oversight without allowing one annual defence package to absorb an ever-growing share of national-security legislation.

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